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THE LONG RISE AND QUICK FALL OF APPRAISAL
ARBITRAGE
WEI JIANG,* TAO Li** & RANDALL THOMAS**

ABSTRACT

Appraisal is a legislatively created right for shareholders to seek a judicial
determination of the fair value of their stock in certain transactions. For many
decades, appraisal was a little-used and frequently maligned corporate law
remedy. Beginning at the turn of the twenty-first century, this all changed when
a group of financial investors, including some hedge funds, began filing
appraisal cases. Appraisal arbitrage, as it became known, grew rapidly in
popularity.
Appraisal arbitrage'ssuccess soon attractednegative attention. In 2016, the
Delaware legislature amended its appraisal statute to eliminate most small
shareholders' appraisal rights and to permit companies to prepay merger
consideration to appraisalpetitioners. In 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court
issued two important decisions emphasizing that deal price was the primary
measure offair valuefor lower courts to use in appraisalproceedings. Appraisal
filings plummeted soon thereafter.
In this Article, we seek to empirically explain the rise andfall of appraisal
arbitrageusing datafrom 2000-2019. For the period 2015-2019, we find that
the averagedeal gross return to appraisalarbitrageis 13.2 %-far less than the
98.2% averagefor the 2000-2014 period. Looking at the main components of
these returns, we find that, on average, prejudgment interest accrualgenerated
total returns of 18.1% for appraisalpetitionersfrom 2015-2019. However, the
difference between the judicially determined fair price minus the deal price
averages negative 5.3%. While both of these numbers are sharply lower than
those in the pre-2015 era, the drop in judicial value improvement is especially
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large. We conclude that the principal reasons for the decline of appraisal
arbitrage were the Delaware Supreme Court's 2017 opinions.
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INTRODUCTION

Appraisal is a legislatively created right for shareholders to seek a judicial
determination of the fair value of their stock in a limited set of corporate
transactions. For many decades, appraisal was a little-used and frequently
1
maligned corporate law remedy. Beginning at the turn of the twenty-first
century, this all changed as a group of financial investors-especially some

specialized hedge funds-began investing in appraisal-eligible merger and
acquisition ("M&A") transactions with the intention of filing appraisal cases and
2
garnering high returns from litigation in this once-stagnant area of law.

Appraisal arbitrage, as it became known, took on a life of its own and grew
rapidly in popularity. 3
Many scholars supported this new form of litigation, arguing that it largely
4
targeted deals with a high likelihood of abuse of minority shareholders. Other
academics opposed the expansion of the appraisal remedy, taking the position
5
that appraisal itself was susceptible to abuse. The debate grew in intensity as
more and more hedge funds began to crowd into the field, so that even high-

profile transactions were not immune to appraisal arbitrage.

The Delaware bar and the Delaware legislature grew concerned about
potential strike suits by small shareholders. A second source of concern was the
arguably high level of prejudgment interest awarded in cases that went to trial.
The Delaware State Bar Association proposed two significant cutbacks to the
scope of the Delaware appraisal statute to address these concerns: one proposal

6
effectively barred small appraisal cases from proceeding, while the other
impacted the amount of prejudgment interest paid by companies in certain

The classic article decrying the value of the remedy is Bayless Manning, The
Shareholder'sAppraisalRemedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962).
2 For a general discussion of the practice, see Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers,
AppraisalArbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WAsH. U. L. REv. 1551,
1566-83 (2015) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, AppraisalArbitrage].
3 From 1977-1997, only 266 appraisal cases-fewer than fourteen cases per year-were
filed in the Court of Chancery for New Castle County, Delaware. Randall S. Thomas, Revising
the DelawareAppraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (2000). These cases contained few
serious claims, and about one-third of the petitions were never answered by the company. Id.
at 23. By comparison, the intensity of appraisal litigation grew substantially from 2000-2019.
See infra Part V.
4 See, e.g., Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei & Randall Thomas, Appraisal: Shareholder
Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J.L. & ECON. 697, 698-99 (2016); Korsmo & Myers,
AppraisalArbitrage, supra note 2, at 1599.
5 See, e.g., William J. Carney & Keith Sharfman, The Death of Appraisal Arbitrage:
Ending Windfallsfor Deal Dissenters, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 61, 96-99 (2018).
6 Under the new law, the so-called de minimis exception requires that the collective group
of appraisal petitioners in any one case hold more than 1% of the outstanding shares, the
consideration for the shares held by the appraisal petitioners exceeds $1 million, or the merger
is a short-form merger. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(g) (2020); see also infra Section III.A.
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circumstances.7 The Delaware legislature enacted the proposed changes on June
16, 2016.8 Subsequently, in 2017 the Delaware courts reshaped the expectation
that appraisal proceedings generally lead to a fair price higher than the deal price.

The Delaware Supreme Court was largely responsible for this change in a series
of opinions rejecting Court of Chancery chancellors' use of discounted cash flow
valuation techniques in favor of the deal price paid by the acquirer. After these
events, appraisal arbitrage rapidly declined.
In this Article, we examine the rise and fall of appraisal arbitrage. In
particular, we sort out empirically the reasons for appraisal arbitrage's initial
popularity and its ultimate collapse. We begin with an overview, documenting
the steady rise and rapid fall of appraisal arbitrage. Using hand-collected data on

all appraisal-eligible deals in Delaware that became effective between January
2000 and June 2019 (and were decided by the court by November 1, 2019), we
show that appraisal arbitrage rose from a handful of case filings (called appraisal
petitions) in the early 2000s to become commonplace in M&A transactions. In

the early years, many of these filings were made by small shareholders. By 2010,
hedge fund investors dominated the ranks of appraisal petitioners, averaging
about 85% of all filings from 2015-2019. At the peak of appraisal actions from
2015-2017, appraisal arbitrageurs challenged approximately 25% of all
appraisal-eligible transactions-only for this to plummet in 2019 to roughly 5%.

The hedge funds filing appraisal petitions were few in number, although the
size of the positions they took grew from $26.3 million from 2000-2014 to an
average of $50 million per case from 2015-2019. We suggest that part of the

reason for this increase was the impact of Delaware legislation that reduced the
number of cases filed by small shareholders. We also find that hedge funds
targeted bigger companies from 2015 and onward. Throughout the full sample
period, a small group of plaintiffs' law firms disproportionately engaged in
litigating these cases.

Appraisal arbitrage cases can be lengthy. While the time from the effective
date of a merger to the filing of the first appraisal petition averages 73 days, the
time to resolution is generally much longer. For example, the average time to

reach settlement after the first petition is filed is 406 days and, if there is a court
decision, the time from filing to that decision averages 2.6 years. Importantly,

during these long intervals, prejudgment interest set at 5% above the risk-free
rate accrues to the benefit of the petitioner and constitutes a significant part of
the returns to appraisal arbitrage.
Hedge funds and other appraisal petitioners target low takeover premium
transactions, with challenged deals exhibiting premiums that are on average 20

7 Section 262(h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") now provides that
companies may choose to reduce the amount of prejudgment interest that they pay in an
appraisal action by tendering all or part of the merger consideration to the petitioner early in
the litigation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h); see also infra Section III.B.

Act of June 16, 2016, 80 Del. Laws 265, §§ 10-11 (codified at DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262(g)-(h)).
8
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deals without

litigation.

Challenged deals are more likely to be minority shareholder squeezeouts or
going-private deals, both of which are widely perceived as most likely to be
subject to abuse by acquirers. Not surprisingly, appraisal litigation in these types

of deals tends to generate higher levels of financial returns to the hedge funds.
This suggests that appraisal arbitrage may serve an agency cost-reduction

function by providing recourse in potentially abusive deals.
In 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court decided DFCGlobal Corp. v. Muirfield
9
Value Partners, L.P. and Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master

Fund Ltd.,1O sending a clear message that the lower court should rely more
heavily on deal price in determining fair value in appraisal actions. This message
was reinforced by a 2019 Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Verition Partners
1
MasterFund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc.' We show that these cases likely led
to lowered gross returns from appraisal arbitrage. We do this by deconstructing
the overall returns to appraisal arbitrage into their component parts.

Comparing data from 2000-2014 to that from 2015-2019, we find that the
average deal gross return in the later period is 13.2%, far less than the 98.2%
average gross returns for 2000-2014. For the more recent time frame, we break

average gross returns into two parts for the cases that went to trial. First, we find
that prejudgment interest accrual, on average, generated total returns of 18.1%
for appraisal petitioners. However, we find that the judicial value improvement

component, which we define as the difference between the judicially determined
fair price minus the deal price, averages negative 5.3%. While both of these

value components are sharply lower than those found in earlier research for the
pre-2015 era, the drop in judicial value improvement-falling from 50.6% on
average into negative territory-is especially large. We conclude that DFC

Global, Dell, and Aruba were particularly important contributors to the fall of
appraisal arbitrage.

This Article proceeds as follows. We begin in Part I with a description of the
mechanics of the Delaware appraisal remedy. Part II examines the practice of
appraisal arbitrage. Perceived abuses led the Delaware legislature to pass
amendments to the Delaware statute that we analyze in Part III. We turn to a

discussion of the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in DFCGlobal, Dell, and
Aruba in Part IV, showing how they created a new emphasis on deal price in

appraisal cases. We begin our empirical analysis in Part V with an explanation
of our data collection and a statistical overview of our sample of appraisal
actions. Part VI completes our empirical analysis with a set of multivariate
regressions.

172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) (en banc).
10 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017) (en banc).
" 210 A.3d 128, 130 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam).
9
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OF APPRAISAL

What Is Appraisal?

Appraisal is a statutory right designed to protect shareholders who are forced
into M&A transactions and who believe that the deal price may not reflect the
fair value of their stock.12 If a shareholder seeks appraisal, a court can order the
corporation to compensate eligible dissenting shareholders for their shares' fair
value as long as the proper procedural requirements are met.1 3 The corporation
must pay this judicially determined value to the dissenting minority shareholders

rather than the deal consideration it paid to the majority.' 4 The challenged
corporation will also be responsible for any accrued prejudgment interest on this
amount.' 5

Today, every state has its own version of the appraisal right, all of which allow
judicial recourse to dissenting shareholders for certain transactions.1 6 All state
appraisal statutes include a merger as a triggering event, and most also include
the sale of substantially all of the corporation's assets and amendments to the

corporate charter.1 7 We focus on the Delaware appraisal statute for two reasons:
first, Delaware is the most important state for corporate law and has a specialized
business court;' 8 and second, Delaware courts handle almost all public company
appraisal litigation.19

12 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h); see also Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Flawed
Corporate Finance of Dell and DFC Global, 68 EMORY L.J. 221, 229 (2018) [hereinafter
Korsmo & Myers, Flawed Corporate Finance] (describing process of appraisal, which
"entitles a dissenting stockholder to refuse the merger consideration and instead have a court
determine the 'fair value' of the dissenter's stock" (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h));
Thomas, supra note 3, at 2 ("Shareholders want appraisal statutes to provide minority
investors with some protection from abuses by majoritarian investors.").
'3 Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal'sRole in Corporate
Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (1995); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262.
14 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h).
15 Id. Prejudgment interest accrues at a quarterly rate from the time the dissenting
shareholders file the appraisal litigation until the company pays the judgment. Id.
16 Jay B. Kesten, The Uncertain Casefor AppraisalArbitrage, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
89, 94-95 (2017).
17 Thompson, supra note 13,
at 9.
11 ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW
6, 37-44 (1993).
19 To find non-Delaware cases, we conducted an extensive search of several electronic
databases and leading corporate law treatises for public company appraisal cases. We found
very few for the 2015-2019 period. First, we searched the keywords "appraisal action" in
Lexis, Westlaw, and Bloomberg Law, restricting our search to state and local courts other
than the Delaware Court of Chancery. All cases we found either involved private companies
or took place before 2015. Second, we located state statutes related to "shareholder appraisal
rights," for example, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 623, 910 (Consol. 2020), and downloaded
cases citing these statutes from Lexis. We found only cases that either involved private firms
or in which the plaintiffs asked courts to enforce appraisal action judgments granted by a
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Delaware'sAppraisalStatute

B.

Appraisal is available to shareholders of Delaware corporations engaged in
cash-out mergers or consolidations but only so long as these shareholders voted
2 0
against or refrained from voting for the transaction However, appraisal rights
are not available in stock-for-stock deals if the corporation is listed on a national
21
securities exchange or has more than 2000 shareholders of record. This
"market-out" exception eliminates the appraisal right because there is no

liquidity concern for dissenting shareholders who receive as consideration stock
22
in a corporation for which a liquid and efficient market exists. However, if
dissenting shareholders receive cash or some other form of nonstock
consideration, the Delaware appraisal statute provides them with appraisal
rights. 23 In other words, if shareholders receive anything other than liquid stock
as consideration in a merger or consolidation transaction, appraisal rights are
available. 24
Shareholders must meet a set of requirements with respect to the shares they

hold in order to exercise their appraisal rights. First, as noted above, shareholders
must not have

voted

for

the

appraisal-eligible

transaction. 25

Second,

shareholders also must not have accepted the consideration paid by the acquirer
for the transaction and instead must wait to receive payment until the appraisal
litigation is resolved.2 6 Third, shareholders must have continuously held the
27
shares for which appraisal is sought through the effectuation of the merger.
Fourth, after 2016, shareholders must meet the de minimis amendment's
28
requirements, discussed more comprehensively in Section III.A below. If the
shareholders' shares meet these requirements and the transaction is eligible for
appraisal, then shareholders can seek to exercise their appraisal rights.
Delaware court. Third, we located appraisal cases cited in Chapter 13 of the Model Business
Corporation Act Annotated. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ch. 13 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016). Upon
reviewing them, we found that almost all of the cited cases were either from Delaware or from
the pre-2015 period. When we presented this Article, we were told that some hedge funds are
considering pursuing appraisal arbitrage in other jurisdictions, but we have found no evidence

that they have filed such cases as of the time of this writing.
20 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a). In other words, shareholders who vote their shares in

&

favor of the transaction forfeit their rights to appraisal.
21 Id. § 262(b)(1).
22 Thomas, supra note 3, at 11 n.35 (quoting RODMAN WARD, JR., EDWARD P. WELCH
ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW

§ 262.2.2

(4th

ed. 1999)).
23 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (creating this exception to market-out exception).
24 Thomas, supra note 3, at 12.
25 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a).

Kesten, supranote 16, at 96.
27 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a).
26

The de minimis exception is set forth in DGCL section 262(g). Id. § 262(g). It provides
that shareholders exercising their appraisal rights must hold, collectively, at least 1% of the
outstanding stock or shares worth more than $1 million. Id.
28
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Corporations must meet their own set of statutory requirements. First,

corporations must notify shareholders of their appraisal rights not less than
twenty days before the shareholders will vote on the transaction that gives rise
to those rights. 29 This notice must include a copy of Delaware General
Corporation Law ("DGCL")

section 262, Delaware's appraisal statute. 30

Second, the corporation must notify, within ten days after the effectuation of the
merger, every shareholder who has both not voted for the transaction and
complied with the appraisal rules about the approval of the merger and of the
availability of appraisal rights. 3 1 Corporations also must file with the Court of

Chancery "a duly verified list containing the names and addresses of all
stockholders who have demanded [appraisal].1"32

After the corporation gives notice to shareholders of their appraisal rights, it
is up to the dissenting shareholders to follow the procedural rules outlined by
section 262.33 Shareholders who wish to exercise their appraisal rights must

"deliver to the corporation, before the taking of the vote on the merger or
consolidation, a written demand for appraisal of such stockholder's shares." 34
This notice allows the corporation to estimate how expensive appraisal litigation

will be since the exercise of appraisal rights could, at the extreme, drain a
corporation's cash. 35 Shareholders also need to prove their status as shareholders
and the authenticity of their signatures. 36 Shareholders who have complied with
these rules may then file an appraisal action within 120 days of the effective date
of the merger. 37 If shareholders determine that they would like to withdraw their
demand for appraisal and accept the deal consideration, they may do so within
sixty days of the effective date of the merger.38
The Delaware Court of Chancery, without a jury, will determine the fair value
of the transaction by assigning a price per share to the stock at issue. 39 The court,
29

Id. § 262(d)(1).

30 Id.

31 Id. § 262(d)(2).
32 Id. § 262(f).
33 Id. § 262(d).
34 Id. § 262(d)(1). There is no particular form that shareholders must use in making the
demand.

R. FRANKLIN

BALOTrI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN,

THE DELAWARE LAW OF

CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9.44[C] (3d ed. 2d Supp. 2019). However, if
the transaction was a short-form merger in which the minority shareholders were not given
an opportunity to vote on the transaction, the shareholders must make an appraisal demand
within twenty days of receiving notice of the transaction. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(2).
3
Thompson, supra note 13, at 21.
36 Thomas, supra note 3, at 13-14.
37 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(e).
38 Id.

39 See Scott Callahan, Darius Palia & Eric Talley, Appraisal Arbitrage and Shareholder
Value, 3 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 147, 148-49 (2018) ("Modern appraisal cases invariably entail
prolix valuation reports by competing experts whose fair value estimates can differ multifold.
By most accounts, non-financially-trained judges find such procedures challenging at best.").
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if all procedural requirements are met by both the shareholders and the
corporation, will give notice of the date and time of the appraisal hearing to the
40
shareholders exercising their appraisal rights. This initial hearing is used to
41
Subsequently, the
determine which shareholders are entitled to appraisal.
Court of Chancery will determine the fair value of the dissenting shareholders'
shares using its own methods of valuation.4 2 The court may also determine how
43
the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and litigation costs will be paid.
II.

APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE

Appraisal arbitrageurs purchase a block of stock in a target company,

generally after the announcement of a merger or consolidation, with the intent
of exercising the shareholder appraisal rights attached to those shares. Their
hope is that the court will find that the fair value of the shares exceeds the deal
price paid in the merger or consolidation. If so, then appraisal arbitrage can be
very profitable.44
Appraisal actions, and therefore appraisal arbitrage, were uncommon until the
mid-2000s 4 5 Appraisal actions increased from 2% to 3% of appraisal-eligible

46
deals in the early 2000s to around 25% of appraisal-eligible deals in the 2010s.
47
By 2016, 20% of public company transactions faced an appraisal claim.

Prior research shows that a small set of hedge funds are important players in
appraisal arbitrage. 48 Hedge funds bring the highest number of appraisal suits

40 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

§ 262(f); Thomas, supra note 3, at 13.

41 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(g).
42 Id. § 262(h); see also Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 36061 (Del. 1997). Also of note, appraisal is treated like a class action for settlement purposes in
that the court must approve any settlement. Thomas, supra note 3, at 14.
43 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 2620). Though the plaintiffs in an appraisal action generally
must pay their own attorneys' fees and expert expenses, they may petition for these expenses
to be deducted on a pro rata basis from the value of all shares entitled to appraisal. Id.;
BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 34, § 9.45[I].
4 Between 2000-2014, these judicial valuation returns exceeded 50% in cases taken to
trial. Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 720-21, 721 tbl.11.
4s Korsmo & Myers, Flawed CorporateFinance,supra note 12, at 230. "Long dismissed
as a 'sleepy corporate backwater'-rarely employed and economically insignificantappraisal has been profoundly transformed by this new arbitrage strategy." Kesten, supranote
16, at 89 (quoting Korsmo & Myers, AppraisalArbitrage, supra note 2, at 1553).
'

Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 699.

12, at 230.
& Talley, supra note 39, at
Palia
Callahan,
also
48 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 706; see
162-63 ("The impact of [the In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.] opinion was
significant, since it made it much easier for hedge funds to engage in appraisal arbitrage,
purchasing a large number of target shares after announcement for their appraisal valueeffectively allowing the arbitrageur to spread the costs of appraisal litigation across the shares
47 Korsmo & Myers, Flawed CorporateFinance, supra note

purchased.").
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and the suits with the largest dollar volumes. 49 From 2000-2014, individuals

were the second most active in filing appraisal actions, followed by public or
private companies, venture capital or private equity firms, and mutual funds. 50
Commentators assert that the Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in In re
Appraisalof Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.51has, in part, contributed to the sharp
increase in appraisal arbitrage.5 2 There, the court held that investors who bought
shares in an appraisal-eligible transaction after the transaction's record date
could exercise appraisal rights even though they may not have voted against, or
abstained from voting for, the transaction with those exact shares. 53 In other
words, shareholders did not need to trace their shares to prove that they had
abstained from voting those shares or had voted those shares against the merger
for purposes of exercising appraisal rights.54 Instead, the court required the

number of shares for which appraisal was sought be less than the total number
of dissenting and abstaining shares.55 The Transkaryotic holding thus made it
much easier for arbitrageurs to bring appraisal actions. 56 As a result of this
decision, hedge funds can purchase shares in a target very close to the

shareholder meeting and exercise their appraisal rights post-transaction by either
seeking settlement or pursuing a trial.57
Importantly, the Transkaryotic holding allows appraisal arbitrageurs full
access to the proxy statement for the transaction at issue before buying shares in

the target, as the solicitation of votes for a transaction is almost always circulated
after the record date. 58 The proxy statement provides important information,

49 Alexandros Seretakis, Appraisal Rights in the US and the EU, in CROSS-BORDER
MERGERS: EU PERSPECTIVES AND NATIONAL EXPERIENCES 65, 72 (Thomas Papadopoulos ed.,
2019) ("A small handful of hedge funds, most notably Merion Capital, Magnetar Capital,
Merlin Partners, Quadre Investments and Ancora, are the top filers both by number of
transactions challenged and total dollar value." (citing Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 706)).
50 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 706 tbl.1. However, mutual funds were second in dollar
volume, the total amount invested in the named firm. Id.

51 No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).
52 Nicholas O'Keefe, Delaware AppraisalActions Are Likely to Continue to Increase in
Frequency Following Two Recent Delaware Chancery Court Decisions, ARNOLD & PORTER
(Feb.
24,
2015),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2015/02
/20150224_delaware_appraisal actions_are_12470/
[https://perma.cc/N2WR-5ASZ]
("[T]here has been a significant increase in the percentage of appraisal petitions in
transactions for which appraisal rights are available since 2011. Many commentators have
asserted that the Transkaryotic decision is one of the causes of the increase in appraisal
arbitrage.").
5 Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *4.
54 O'Keefe, supra note 52.
5
Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Asking the Right Question: The Statutory Right of
Appraisaland Efficient Markets, 74 Bus. LAW. 1015, 1026 (2019).
56 O'Keefe, supra note 52.
57 Macey & Mitts, supra note 55, at 1026.
51 Kesten, supra note 16, at 102.
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such as an explanation of the deal process and investment banker fairness
opinions, which allows shareholders to decide whether they will vote for a
deal. 59 Using this information, appraisal arbitrageurs can better estimate whether

shareholders will react favorably to a transaction. If a transaction is likely to
receive majority approval, arbitrageurs may accumulate more shares in order to
exercise their appraisal rights.

In addition to the value that may come from the court's determination that fair
value exceeds deal price, another source of returns to appraisal actions is,

effectively, interest rate arbitrage. Appraisal suits have a high rate of
prejudgment interest, equal to the federal discount rate plus 5%.60 In recent
years, this return is much higher than elsewhere in the market for fixed-income
investments and helps to eliminate downside risk in appraisal actions. Prior
scholarship found that during the 2000-2014 period, over half of the returns to
61
appraisal actions were from interest accrual.
III.

AMENDMENTS TO THE DELAWARE APPRAISAL STATUTE

In the eyes of critics, the frequent settlement of cases involving small claims
and the high returns to appraisal arbitrage made appraisal actions look like a new
form of strike suit. Some of these critics claimed that appraisal caused
62
shareholders to lose, rather than gain, value in their transactions. Were
appraisal rights hurting, rather than protecting, shareholders while also harming
63
the deal market by creating uncertainty and increasing transaction risk?

Heeding the critics, on June 16, 2016, the Delaware legislature passed

amendments to the DGCL to address two of the most salient problems with
appraisal arbitrage. 64 The first was the de minimis exception, which limits who
can sue by placing lower bounds on the size of appraisal claims (while providing

59 Id.
60 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 701. However, it should be noted that the Federal Reserve
lowered interest rates three times in 2019, causing the return available on prejudgment interest
in appraisal suits to shrink. See infra Figure 3; see also Policy Tools: Open Market
Operations, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYs., https://www.federalreserve.gov
/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm [https:/perma.cc/87EN-S7M7] (last updated Mar. 16,

2020).
61 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 725-27.
62 Appraisal can cause more harm than good for shareholders, who may "lose outwhether by losing a value maximizing deal altogether or through value leakage to appraisal
arbitrageurs." Martin Lipton & Theodore N. Mirvis, Delaware Court of Chancery Appraises
Fully-Shopped Company at Nearly 30% Over Merger Price, HARv. L. ScH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (June 3, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/03/delaware-courtof-chancery-appraises-fully-shopped-company-at-nearly-30-over-merger-price/

[https://perma.cc/79S3-7TZP].
63 See Korsmo & Myers, Flawed CorporateFinance, supra note 12, at 234-35.
" Act of June 16, 2016, 80 Del. Laws ch. 265, §§ 10-11 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 262(g)-(h) (2020)).
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exceptions for certain forms of transactions, such as short-form mergers). 65 The

second was the interest-reduction amendment, which allows corporations to
prepay part or all of the merger consideration to appraisal petitioners and thereby
limit the amount of prejudgment interest due. 66
A.

The De Minimis Exception

The de minimis exception reduces the number of appraisal actions by
requiring that complainants hold, collectively, at least 1% of the total
outstanding number of shares or shares worth more than $1 million at the closing
of the merger.67 The exception makes it more difficult for individual
shareholders, who frequently hold a smaller number of shares than arbitrageurs,
to bring an appraisal suit. These shareholders must overcome collective action
problems and form a coalition in order to meet one of the de minimis exception's
thresholds. To illustrate the hurdle, recent scholarship shows that between 25%
and 33% of previously appraisal-eligible transactions would not meet either of

the de minimis exception's thresholds. 68
Overall, the de minimis exception has a disproportionately negative impact

on individual shareholders. Hedge funds generally meet the exception's
thresholds and remain eligible to seek appraisal. Further, hedge funds with small
initial positions can buy shares to get above the exception's thresholds and
pursue an appraisal action against a company. 69
B.

The Interest-Reduction Amendment
One of the more controversial aspects of appraisal arbitrage is that the statute

provides for the accrual of prejudgment interest in cases that go to trial. 70
Appraisal claims usually take two to three years to resolve, making prejudgment

interest a significant part of the award to dissenting shareholders in appraisal

65
66

67

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(g).
Id. § 262(h).
Id. § 262(g) ("[T]he Court shall dismiss the proceedings as to all holders of such shares

who are otherwise entitled to appraisal rights unless (1) the total number of shares entitled to
appraisal exceeds 1% of the outstanding shares of the class or series eligible for appraisal, [or]
(2) the value of the consideration provided in the merger or consolidation for such total
number of shares exceeds $1 million .....
68 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 724.
69 As per Transkaryotic, hedge funds can purchase shares in the target
or acquirer after the
record vote for the transaction, making it possible to purchase enough shares to meet the de
minimis exception and thus exercise their appraisal rights. In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic

Therapies, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).
This assumes that the hedge fund's position is not already one that meets the de minimis
exception.
70 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h).
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suits.71 Some commentators claim that these payments are not economically
efficient because they increase the costs of appraisal for the company for reasons
unrelated to the merger and may discourage socially beneficial transactions as a
result. 72 The interest-reduction amendment attempts to address this problem by
allowing corporations, after an appraisal action is filed, to prepay part or all of
the merger consideration. 73 This effectively limits the interest that will accrue to
the amount payable on the difference between the judgment and the prepaid
consideration. 74 In other words, prejudgment interest accrues only on the amount
of the judicial award of fair value that exceeds the amount prepaid by the
defendant. Therefore, prepayment can greatly reduce-and potentially
75
eliminate-the prejudgment interest owed.

However, unlike the de minimis exception, which appears to have curbed
appraisal suits, the interest-reduction amendment may have had little effect on
appraisal arbitrage. Because the DGCL does not offer guidance with respect to
prepayment, there is some uncertainty regarding how the prepayment process

works. 76 Such uncertainty deters defendants from taking advantage of the
amendment. Further, prepayments may work to fund appraisal actions and thus
may hurt-rather than help-defendants. If they prepay the merger
consideration, defendants provide a chunk of money to claimants at the start of
litigation. These funds might then be used by the dissenting shareholders to pay
77
their attorneys' fees and other litigation costs.
Prepayment may also reduce settlement leverage because it both lowers the

amount of capital plaintiffs must invest in litigation and provides dissenting
shareholders with liquidity, which would have been a major cost of appraisal
since plaintiffs must forego receiving the merger payment as part of exercising

?1 Gaurav Jetley & Xinyu Ji, Appraisal Arbitrage-Is There a Delaware Advantage?, 71

Bus. LAW. 427, 452 & n.86 (2016).
72

Kesten, supra note 16, at 92.

73 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) ("At any time before the entry of judgment in the
proceedings, the surviving corporation may pay to each stockholder entitled to appraisal an
amount in cash, in which case interest shall accrue thereafter as provided herein only upon
the sum of (1) the difference, if any, between the amount so paid and the fair value of the
shares as determined by the Court, and (2) interest theretofore accrued, unless paid at that
time.").
74 Id.

75 See Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 721 tbl. 11 (demonstrating that prejudgment interest
accrual accounted for, on average, 57.8% of returns to appraisal actions).
76 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h).
77 R. Garrett Rice, Give Me Back My Money: A Proposed Amendment to Delaware's
Prepayment System in Statutory Appraisal Cases, 73 Bus. LAW. 1051, 1079-80 (2018);
Arthur R. Bookout, Daniel S. Atlas & Andrew D. Kinsey, DelawareAppraisalActions: When
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLoM LLP (May 29,
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/05/insights-the-delaware2018),
edition/delaware-appraisal-actions/ [https://perma.cc/R43G-QT3N].

Does It Make Sense to Prepay?, SKADDEN, ARPs,
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their appraisal rights. 78 Finally, prepayment risks losing the excess payment

amount if the appraisal value turns out to be lower than the deal value. 79 As a
result, the interest-reduction amendment appears to have been infrequently used
by defendants in practice. 80
IV.

DFC GLOBAL, DELL, AND ARUBA: THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT CUTS
BACK SHARPLY ON APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE

The Delaware Supreme Court further limited the benefits of appraisal
arbitrage through its decisions in DFCGlobal, Dell, and Aruba. In DFC Global

and Dell, the court reversed lower court decisions holding that fair value was
above deal price and instead determined that deal price, while not presumptively
the fair value of the transaction, was a strong indicator of fair value. 81In Aruba,
the Delaware Supreme Court reemphasized these two holdings and found that
fair value in an appraisal action should be deal price less the value of the
synergies of the deal, resulting in an appraisal value 23% below the deal price. 82
In this Part, we discuss these decisions and their potential impact on the
returns available from appraisal actions for appraisal arbitrageurs.

78 Bookout, Atlas & Kinsey, supra note 77. Shareholders exercising
their appraisal rights
accept no consideration from the deal until the appraisal action has been resolved. DEL. CODE

ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a).
79 Rice, supra note 77, at 1053. One interesting recent case, In re Appraisal of Panera

Bread Co., C.A. No. 2017-0593-MTZ, 2020 WL 506684 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020), did involve
a prepayment by a defendant, but the defendant overpaid and was unsuccessful in clawing
back the overpayment from the petitioner. Id. at *43-44 (refusing Panera's request for refund
because parties did not agree to clawback provision and there was "no present basis in
Delaware's appraisal statute" for prepayment refund). The Panera court cited to only one
other instance of prepayment, but that case involved a clawback provision in case of
overpayment. Id. at *43 n.688 (citing Stipulation Regarding Merger Consideration Payment
Terms at 5, Artic Invs. LLC v. Medivation, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0009-JRS, 2017 WL 2800743

(Del. Ch. June 27, 2017)).
80 Berton Ashman Jr., Christopher Kelly & Mathew Golden, Appraisal Practice Tips 1
Year After Prepayment Amendment, LAw360 (July 31, 2017,
10:44 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/944765/appraisal-practice-tips- 1-year-after-prepaymentamendment (explaining how many factors must be "considered when determining whether,
how and the extent to which a corporation should make a prepayment").
81 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, 21-23 (Del.

2017) (en banc); DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 366 (Del.
2017) (en banc).
82

Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 130, 142

(Del. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam).
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DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.
DFC Global, an established payday loans provider, primarily operated in the

83
Canada, United Kingdom, and the United States. In 2005, DFC Global went

84
public and began trading on the NASDAQ. DFC Global experienced rapid
growth over the two decades preceding 2014.85 However, its business structure

required it to frequently secure new loans in order to pay its existing loan

obligations. 86 As such, it was important that DFC Global maintain a good credit
rating. However, changes in the market caused DFC Global to earn a
noninvestment-grade credit rating, halting the company's ability to borrow
87
money and thus hurting its ability to run its business. Further, rising regulatory

risk in each of DFC Global's three primary markets contributed to its liquidity
problem. 88 The payday loan industry was increasingly subject to regulations that

harmed DFC Global's bottom line.
As a result, DFC Global's earnings outlook was poor and the company began
to contemplate a sale, employing Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc. to help find sale
alternatives. 89 In 2012, Houlihan began its search for interested buyers by
contacting private equity firms, reaching out to more than forty over the next
year. 90 In October 2013, Lone Star, a private equity buyer, expressed interest in

buying DFC Global. 91 On December 12, 2013, Lone Star submitted a
92
nonbinding indication of interest in DFC Global for $12.16 per share. Several
days later, a second financial buyer, J.C. Flowers, made an indication of interest
93
at $13.50 per share. However, DFC Global's management kept lowering its

83 DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 351. At the time of the transaction at issue, DFC Global
operated in more than 1500 locations in ten countries and on the Internet. Id. DFC Global
operated 292 stores in the United States and 601 stores in the United Kingdom at the time of
the merger. Id. at 351-52. In 2004, it had 214 stores in Canada. Id. at 352.

84 Id. DFC Global had a public float of 39.6 million shares and a high average daily trading
"

volume. Id. Its market was efficient: "DFC's share price moved sharply in reaction to
information about the company's performance, the industry, and the overall economy ....

Id.
85 Id. at 350.
86 Id. at 350, 353.
87 Id. at 353.
88 Id. at 353-54.
89 Id. at 355.

90 Id. Houlihan initially contacted six buyers, three of which conducted due diligence but
lost interest. Id. Houlihan then contacted thirty-five financial buyers and three strategic
buyers. Id. This is evidence of an adequate market check and provides support that DFC
Global followed the proper process in pursuing a sale.
9' Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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earnings projections, which resulted in Lone Star lowering its bid and J.C.
Flowers dropping out. 94
On March 11, 2014, DFC Global entered into an exclusivity agreement with

Lone Star.95 Meanwhile, DFC Global's adjusted earnings before interest, tax,
depreciation, and amortization ("EBITDA") projection fell another $24 million
and the company missed its earnings target for fiscal year 2014.96 As a result of
these earnings mishaps, Lone Star dropped its offer to $9.50 per share. 97
Nevertheless, DFC Global's board approved the merger with Lone Star and the

deal closed on June 30, 2014.98
An appraisal action soon followed. DFC Global's dissenting and abstaining
shareholders contended that the transaction's fair value was $17.90.99 DFC
Global had used a good process: it hired an investment bank to shop the company
and it conducted an arm's-length negotiation,1 00 which supported using deal

94 Id. In November 2013, DFC Global's adjusted EBITDA for 2014 was estimated at
$219.3 million. Id. In February 2014, management decreased this projection by 16.8% to
$182.5 million. Id. In response to these adjustments, Lone Star adjusted its bid to $11 per
share and J.C. Flowers withdrew its indication of interest. Id. Decreased earnings projections
mean that the company is worth less than it was when buyers initially expressed interest, and
bids will be lower as a result. Decreased earnings projections also introduce uncertainty into
the deal process, causing bids to be lower.
95 Id. at 356. Transactions with financial buyers are often scrutinized more by courts than
transactions involving strategic buyers. This is because courts worry about management
entrenchment. Financial buyers tend to keep on existing management while strategic buyers
do more to change the operations of the company. Courts want to ensure that transactions are
done for the benefit of the corporation's stockholders rather than because management was
poised for a windfall.
96 Id. DFC Global's fiscal year ended on June 30, 2014, a few weeks after the deal closed.
Id. at 357. However, because DFC Global was performing so poorly and was continuously
missing its earnings projections, Lone Star likely priced the high probability of DFC Global
missing financial targets in fiscal year 2014 into its offer.
97 Id. at 356. DFC Global's adjusted EBITDA projections continued to fall, this time to

$153.1 million. Id.
98 Id. at 356-57.
99 Id. at 357. Petitioners used a discounted cash flow analysis to determine fair value. Id.
Their expert also used a comparable companies analysis with seven of DFC Global's peers.
Id. However, he used EBITDA multiples for the 75th percentile of DFC Global's peer group
when DFC Global ranked below the 50th percentile for most of the key metrics. Id. This
illustrates the difficulties with fair value determinations. Experts will use valuation methods
that favor their clients and choose the metrics that will yield more favorable outcomes, leading
to results that may not be very accurate.
l00 Id. at 349. The Court of Chancery found, based on the record, that
i) the transaction resulted from a robust market search that lasted approximately two
years in which financial and strategic buyers had an open opportunity to buy without
inhibition of deal protections; ii) the company was purchased by a third party in an arm's
length sale; and iii) there was no hint of self-interest that compromised the market check.
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101
price as the measure of fair value in an appraisal action. However, the Court
of Chancery gave DFC Global's deal price only a one-third weight in its fair
02
value analysis.1

On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that deal price "is the
103
Such a case results
most reliable evidence of fair value in a certain case."
when the transaction is absent conflicts of interest and "real world transaction
prices can be the most probative evidence of fair value even through appraisal's
particular lens."104 Deal price is the result of a collective belief about the
company's value rather than a single person's valuation analysis and is thus
05
persuasive evidence of a transaction's fair value.1 Further, deal price is not
variable, whereas many valuation techniques often result in a wide range of
06
values even when the same technique is used to evaluate a single transaction.1
According to the court, deal prices that are the result of "an open process,
informed by robust public information, and easy access to deeper, non-public
information, in which many parties with an incentive to make a profit had a
07
chance to bid" are very likely to reflect fair value.1 So, appraisal arbitrageurs
need evidence such as a conflict of interest or lack of an arm's-length negotiation
in order to make a persuasive case that the deal price is not equivalent to the fair
value of the transaction.1 08 Absent such evidence, fair value is likely to equal
deal price.1 09
However, DFCGlobal did not create a judicial presumption that deal price is
0
equal to fair value for purposes of appraisal." The Delaware Supreme Court
Id. (citing In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., C.A. No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at
*21 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016)).
101 Id.

DFC Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at *23.
103 DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 367.
102

Id. at 370.
10 Macey & Mitts, supra note 55, at 1032 ("[Discounted cash flow] calculations are highly

104

subjective, and courts have expressed frustration with the wildly divergent views of
competing experts who often arrive at wildly different valuations for companies when
employing a [discounted cash flow] analysis.").
'0
See, e.g., Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 36
(Del. 2017) (en banc) (noting that both parties used discount cash flow analysis but produced

valuations differing by $28 billion).
107 DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 349.
108 However, transactions with conflicts of interest and lack of arm's-length negotiations
are exactly the transactions that appraisal arbitrageurs like to target. Nevertheless, courts are
likely to view such transactions as having followed proper process, leaving appraisal
arbitrageurs without leverage to argue that fair value is higher than deal price.
109 See id. at 359 (describing such cases as those where "[t]he deal did not involve the
potential conflicts of interest inherent in a management buyout or negotiations to retain
existing management" (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., C.A.

No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at *21 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016))).
"1 Id. at 363.
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refused to hold that deal price and fair value are always equivalents.' 1 ' Instead,
the court determined that DGCL section 262 calls for the Delaware Court of
Chancery to perform an independent evaluation of fair value."1 2 The Court of
Chancery needs "broad discretion ... to determine the fair value of the
company's shares, considering 'all relevant factors."'13
B.

Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd.

The appraisal litigation in Dell arose from a management-led buyout
("MBO") transaction where Michael Dell, the founder, CEO, and 15.4%
shareholder of Dell, Inc., teamed up with Silver Lake Partners L.P., a private
equity firm.' '4 Dell's stock had dropped from $18 to $12 per share during the
first half of 2012 and the company was facing increased competition from
cheaper and newer technologies." 5 In June 2012, Stanley Cates of Southeastern
Asset Management, Inc. approached Michael Dell to suggest an MBO."1 6 In
August 2012, a second private equity firm, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P.
("KKR"), expressed interest in buying Dell."17

Michael Dell decided to pursue an MBO with the help of Silver Lake
Partners.' 8 In anticipation of this MBO, Dell's board of directors created an
independent special committee to evaluate possible transactions.1 9 During
negotiations with Silver Lake Partners and KKR, Dell's stock price continued to

fall and the company continued to miss its projected revenue targets.120

"

Id.
Id. at 364, 366.
"3 Id. at 364 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2020)).
112

14

Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 5, 9 (Del.

2017) (en banc).
"15 Id. at 6.
116 Id. at 8. Michael Dell owned 13.9% of Dell's outstanding shares as of August 2012. Id.
at 9.
"?7Id. at 8.
"1 Id. Goldman Sachs, Dell's financial advisor, told Michael Dell that an MBO would be
too difficult. Id. However, KKR informed Michael Dell that an MBO was possible and offered
to help facilitate such a transaction. Id.
119 Id. The independent special committee was composed of four independent directors
and was properly empowered to hire its own legal and financial advisors. Id. An independent
special committee, properly empowered, is evidence of fair process. Thus, the record lent
support to the conclusion that Dell followed a fair process in undergoing the transaction. The
independent special committee's financial advisor, JPMorgan, informed it that both KKR and
Silver Lake Partners were highly qualified potential acquirers. Id. at 9. JPMorgan also
informed the independent special committee that financial, rather than strategic, buyers were
the appropriate targets for this MBO. Id.
120 Id. at 10.
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12
Eventually, KKR pulled out of the MBO discussions. 1 But by January 24,
22
2013, three more private equity firms expressed interest in purchasing Dell.1

After exploring all available options and negotiating with Silver Lake
Partners, Dell's board accepted Silver Lake Partner's fmal offer and entered into
a merger agreement. 123 The agreement offered several deal protections,
including a forty-five-day go-shop period, a one-time match right, and a
termination fee provision.1 24 The board then arranged for a stockholder vote on
5
the transaction and recommended the transaction to shareholders.12 The
transaction ultimately closed at $13.75 per share, a 37% premium to Dell's

126
ninety-day-average unaffected stock price.
In Dell, the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to use deal price in its
27
determination of fair value and instead used a discounted cash flow analysis.1

The court found flaws in Dell's deal process, making deal price an inappropriate

variable in measuring the transaction's fair value.1 28 According to the court,
there were three problems with Dell's process: (1) a valuation gap between
Dell's stock price and its intrinsic value, (2) a lack of strategic buyers in the sale
29
process, and (3) a go-shop that undercut the deal price's credibility.1
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that deal price
could, and maybe should, be used in determining the fair value of Dell's
transaction. 130 More generally, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that
when deal price is put aside in favor of another valuation methodology, such

121 Id. After KKR withdrew, Dell's independent special committee reached out to private
equity firm Texas Pacific Group, L.P. Id. However, Texas Pacific Group determined that the
computer industry was too volatile and declined Dell's investment proposal. Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 12-15. The independent special committee managed to get Silver Lake Partners
to raise its offer six times. Id. at 11. The independent special committee agreed to $13.65 of
cash consideration per share and to continue paying Dell's regular quarterly dividend through

closing. Id.
124 Id. at 12. Go-shop periods allow targets to seek competing offers after receiving an
offer. See id. at 29. Match rights allow the buyer to match a better bid made subsequent to the
buyer's initial offer. See Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A.

No. 11448-VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *38 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018). Termination fees must
be paid if the target pulls out of the transaction (reverse termination fees are paid by the
acquirer to the target). See id. Here, there were two different termination fees. Dell, 177 A.3d
at 12. Termination fees were $180 million if Dell agreed to a "Superior Proposal," as defined
by the merger agreement, or $450 million if Dell agreed to a non-Superior Proposal. Id.
125 Id. at 15. During this time, a hostile tender offer was made for Dell. Id. However, the
proxy advisory firms recommended to stockholders that they vote in favor of the MBO. Id.
126 Id. at 5.
127

In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., C.A. No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *22, *51 (Del.

Ch. May 31, 2016).
128 Id. at *29-44.
129 Id.
130

Dell, 177 A.3d at 6, 30.

THE RISE AND FALL OF APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE

2020]

2153

action requires an adequate explanation by the lower court and must have
support in the record.' 3' The Delaware Supreme Court remanded the issue of
fair value to the Delaware Court of Chancery so that it could determine this value
using the evidence in the record.1 32 The holding in Dell, decided only months
after DFC Global, reinforced the importance of deal price in determining fair
value for appraisal purposes.1 33
C.

Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc.

Decided toward the end of our sample period, Aruba highlights once more the
importance of deal price in determining fair value when a transaction is free of
deficiencies and conflicts of interest. This appraisal litigation arose out of a deal
between Hewlett-Packard ("HP") and Aruba Networks, Inc.1 34 HP approached
Aruba in August 2014 about a business combination.1 35 In response to this offer,

Aruba took the necessary steps to establish a good process and hired experts to
help it evaluate HP's offer, negotiate the terms, and shop the deal.1 36 Aruba
approached five other strategic bidders in an attempt to find alternatives to HP's
offer, but none of the bidders expressed interest.1 37 Several months later, Aruba's
board voted to accept HP's offer at $24.67 per share.1 38 To ensure no better deal
was available, Aruba conducted one more passive market check postsigning, but

no superior bidder emerged.1
18, 2015.140

39

Dissenting and abstaining

The deal between HP and Aruba closed on May
stockholders then filed an appraisal action

contending that the fair value of the transaction was $32.57 per share, a
significant premium to the deal's price.141 In its fair value analysis, the Delaware

Court of Chancery used the thirty-day average market price of Aruba's shares to
determine a fair value of $17.13 per share.1 42 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme

Court rejected the Court of Chancery's use of the thirty-day average market price
in determining fair value because such an analysis was "rooted in an erroneous
131 Id. at 5.

132

Id. at 35 ("[F]ailure to give the resulting price heavy weight because the trial judge
believes there was mispricing missed by all the Dell stockholders, analysts, and potential
buyers abuses even the wide discretion afforded the Court of Chancery in these difficult
cases.").
133 See id. at 30 ("[D]eal price has heavy, if not overriding, probative value.").
34 Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448-VCL,

2018 WL 922139, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018).
1

Id. at *8.

136

Id.

'37

Id. at *10.

138

Id. at *19.

1 Id. at
'o Id. at
4' Id. at
42 Id. at

*21-22.
*22.
*2.
*55.
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143
Instead, the Delaware Supreme
factual finding that lacked record support."
Court held that the fair value of Aruba's transaction was $19.10, the deal price
minus the portion of synergies left with the seller as estimated by Aruba.144
Aruba holds that deal synergies from a transaction must be excluded from the
fair value calculation, resulting in a fair value that is lower than the consideration
paid for the deal.1 45 So, once deal price is determined to be fair, the court will
then consider synergies and subtract these from deal price to determine fair
value. As a result, appraisal arbitrageurs are often better off voting in favor of
the deal and selling their stock to an acquirer in order to receive the deal's full

consideration, including any gain from synergies created by the transaction.
D.

Summary
Commentators argue that the Delaware Supreme Court's holdings in these

three cases greatly diminished the available rate of return on appraisal
litigation.1 46 If fair value equals the deal's consideration almost by default,
especially for arm's-length transactions, then prejudgment interest accrual is the
only avenue available for appraisal arbitrageurs to earn a positive return.

However, if defendant corporations employ the interest-reduction amendment,
there will be little to no prejudgment interest accruing on the award to dissenting
shareholders. Without a fair value greater than the deal's consideration or the
accrual of prejudgment interest, appraisal suits could now very well result in
losses for appraisal arbitrageurs, especially after they net out their litigation and
opportunity costs. We turn next to the empirical part of our study in which we
critically assess these arguments using a broad sample of appraisal arbitrage
cases.
V.

DATA SOURCES AND EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW OF THE DATA

Data Sources and Sample Construction

A.

There are two key inputs to our study: first, we need to create a sample of
M&A transactions that qualify for appraisal; and second, we need to determine
which transactions actually generated appraisal petitions. Building off the
sample collected for the 2000-2014 period and the procedure used in Jiang, Lee,

Mei, and Thomas,1 47 we construct a sample of all appraisal-eligible transactions
and actual appraisal actions from January 2000 to June 2019, emphasizing the
post-2014 period so as to assess the impact of legislative changes in the
Delaware appraisal statute and the Delaware Supreme Court's landmark

decisions in DFC Global, Dell, and Aruba. We restrict the sample to deals filed
Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 130 (Del.
2019) (en banc) (per curiam).

143

44 Id.
45 Id. at 133.
46 See, e.g., Korsmo & Myers, Flawed CorporateFinance, supra note 12, at 224.
47 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 703-12.
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in the Delaware Court of Chancery as that is where most important appraisal
cases are litigated.
We start with a comprehensive sample of potential appraisal candidates:
M&A transactions in which shareholders are eligible to seek appraisal.

Following the work of Hsieh and Walkling1 48 and Edmans, Goldstein, and
Jiang,1 49 we narrow down the full sample of transactions covered by the
Securities Data Company ("SDC") by excluding those classified as a divestiture,
spinoff, or repurchase, and we ensure that the transactions are M&A activities

that result in effective control changes. We find 869 deals in which the target
firms were incorporated in Delaware completed in the 2015-2019 period.

There is no official database for potential or appraisal-eligible deals. To
construct such a sample, we narrow the full sample of M&A transactions by

requiring either that the deal is a cash or hybrid (part cash and part stock) deal
or that the acquirer is a private company in a stock deal, as these are statutory
restrictions under Delaware law. 150 To ensure accuracy on eligibility, we crosscheck or supplement the SDC data (which has many "unknown" and "other"
data entries) by manually collecting form of payment information from merger

agreements and Forms 8-K filed with the SEC. Combined, these criteria result
in a sample of 545 appraisal-eligible deals for the period running from January

2015 through June 2019.
The SDC database provides information on a deal's announcement date,
effective date, withdrawal date, and premium, as well as characteristics of the
target. Firm characteristics and information related to stock prices and returns
come from Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices ("CRSP").

Finally, information about ownership, such as institutional holdings and insider
ownership, is retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Ownership Database.
Institutional ownership is aggregated from individual institutions' quarter-end
holdings disclosed in Forms 13F. Using individual insider ownership datawhich is recorded on a firm's Forms 3, 4, and 5 when an insider trades in the
firm's securities-we construct the aggregate insider ownership of a firm in a

given year-end using each insider's most recent ownership information up to
that time.

Our construction of a comprehensive sample of appraisal petitions filed in the
Delaware Court of Chancery relies on the Bloomberg Law database. For the
2015-2019 period, we search the Delaware Court of Chancery dockets using the
keyword "appraisal" and identify 223 unique appraisal cases targeting 140 deals

based on the transaction's effective date. After we merge this "event sample" of
appraisals with the full sample of eligible deals from the SDC, we end up with

148 Jim Hsieh & Ralph A. Walkling, Determinantsand Implications ofArbitrage Holdings
in Acquisitions, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 605, 611 (2005).
149 Alex Edmans, Itay Goldstein & Wei Jiang, The Real Effects ofFinancialMarkets: The
Impact of Prices on Takeovers, 67 J. FIN. 933, 945-46 (2012).
50 See supra Part I.
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122 matches, while the remaining 423 eligible deals constitute our "control

sample."
Last, we combine both the eligible deals sample and the appraisals from 20152019 with the corresponding samples from the earlier study by Jiang et al.
covering the 2000-2014 period. 5 1
Empirical Overview of the Data

B.

Figure 1 provides an overview of appraisal activity in terms of the number of
deals as well as the percentage of eligible deals.
Figure 1. Deals Resulting in Appraisal Petitions in the Delaware Court of

Chancery.
45

- 30%

-

40

25%

35
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25
20

20%

-
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10%

15
10
5

5%

0
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r-iNumber of deals targeted by appraisal petitioners (left axis)
-

Percent of eligible deals targeted by appraisal petitioners (right axis)

This figure shows appraisal activities from January 2000 to June 2019. The gray bars (left
axis) plot the number of announced M&A transactions targeted by petitioners in each year

(by their effective dates). The black line (right axis) plots the percentage of petition-eligible
deals actually targeted, as recorded by the SDC. An eligible deal must meet the following
requirements: (1) the target company is incorporated in Delaware and (2) it is a cash or hybrid
deal, or the acquirer is a private company in a stock deal. Data sources include the SDC, the
Delaware Court of Chancery, and Bloomberg Law. Section V.A above provides detailed
information about the sample and data.

The chart shows a rather gradual, decade-long rise of appraisal litigation from
the early 2000s to the mid-2010s and a precipitous descent in 2018-2019. The

percentage of eligible deals challenged by investors increased from below 5%
to around 25% of all potential transactions. The plateau lasted from 2015 to

2017, followed by a steep drop back to 5-10% toward the end of our sample.

151 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 705 fig.l.
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Table I provides a breakdown of appraisal petitioners for the 2015-2019
period.
Table 1. Investor Types of Appraisal Petitioners and Their Investments (January

20 15-June 2019).
Number
Unique

Number of
Deals

Percent of
Total Dollar

Investors

Targeted

Volume (%)

Hedge funds

68

100

85.59

Mutual funds

7

12

9.06

Individual investors

29

29

0.52

Type of Investor

Public and private
c pais10 103.74
companies
Banking and financial
services firms
Pension funds

0.04
1

1.05

Hedge funds account for 57.6% of the sample of unique players and 85.6% of
the deal volume. Clearly, these funds are the major players in appraisal filings
during this time period. Mutual funds and companies are a distant second and
third, responsible respectively for 9.1% and 3.7% of the deal volume. The long
rise and quick fall of appraisals, displayed in Figure 1, seems to be driven by
hedge funds. Figure 2 plots the time series of petitioners from 2000-2019.
Figure 2. Number of Appraisal Petitions by Investor Type.
70

S40
"30

0ry
S10

* Hedge Funds

Individuals

This figure delineates the total number of appraisal petitions brought by individuals and
hedge funds two major groups of petitioners- from January 2000 to June 2019.
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Prior to 2010, appraisals were mostly a venue for smaller individual investors.
During that early period, 64.5% of petitions were filed by non-hedge fund
investors. Since 2011, this percentage has declined dramatically to 28.0%.

53
152
suggest that
and Jiang et al.1
Earlier studies by Korsmo and Myers

appraisal became a specialized arbitrage strategy for hedge funds, which took
stakes in M&A targets to seek higher judicially determined fair value valuations

as well as lucrative accrued interest payments. This activity was fueled by the
2007 Transkaryotic decision.

154

The dry up of appraisal activities in 2018 and

2019 was driven by dissipating hedge fund interest, especially after the recent
55
Delaware decisions in DFC Global, Dell, and Aruba.1 After these cases were
decided, hedge fund appraisal filings dropped to an annual average of about 25%
of the level launched from 2015-2017.
Despite the dominance of hedge funds in appraisal arbitrage, only a small
group of hedge funds are frequent players. Table 2 shows that the top ten players
account for 70.7% of the deals and 54.7% of the dollar volume during the 2015-

2019 period.

152 Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage,supra note 2, at 1572-76.
53 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 706.
154 See supra Part II.
155

See supra Part IV.
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Table 2. Top Players of Appraisal Petitions (January 2015-June 2019).
Percent
Petitioner

Investor

ye

Blueblade Capital Opportunities
LCHedge
LLC

Number
of Deals

o

Percent of

oa

Unique

Dollar

Deals

Volume

(%0)

%)

fund

18

12.86

2.26

Quadre Investments, LP
Verition Fund Management LLC

Hedge fund

12

8.57

0.42

Hedge fund

11

7.86

6.36

BlueMountain Capital
Management LLC

Hedge fund

10

7.14

13.53
0.55

Merlin Partners LP

Hedge fund

8

5.71

The Arbitrage Fund

Mutual fund

7

5.00

4.98

Burford Capital Ltd.
Brigade Capital Management, LP
Merion Capital LP

Hedge fund

7

5.00

4.77

Hedge fund

6

4.29

2.91

Hedge fund

5

3.57

12.70

Fir Tree Capital Management LP
Driehaus Capital Management

Hedge fund
Hedge fund

5
5

3.57
3.57

0.70

Hedge fund

5

3.57

0.11

5.36

LLC
AAMAF, LP (Ancora Advisors,

LLC)

If we compare the figures in Table 2 for 2015-2019 with a similar table in
Jiang et al.1 56 for 2000-2014, the top players in the extended sample period are

a mixture of familiar names and new challengers. For example, Blueblade
Capital Management, which was not in the top ten list for 2000-2014,157 became

the top player with 12.9% of all deals in 2015-2019. A mutual fund, The
Arbitrage Fund, was also new to the list of top ten players.1 58
Table 3 shows the high degree of concentration of the law firms representing
appraisal seekers.

156 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 706 tbl.2.
157 See id.

158 See id. The name of the mutual fund suggests that these players view appraisal as an
arbitrage strategy rather than a remedy for a past investment.
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Table 3. Top Law Firms Representing Plaintiffs (January 2015-June 2019).
Number of Cases
N ______Cse

Average % of Stock

Ownership

_____

thrHedge
All All Hedge
Heg
HegeIndividuals Other
Plaintiffs Funds Indivda_ Clients Funds

Other
nividuals Otde
Clients

&

Grant

Eisenhofer

52

49

1

2

2.01

0.43

2.59

24

19

2

3

1.67

3.41

2.66

25

24

0

1

3.75

18

18

0

0

1.33

13

3

0

10

1.58

P.A.

Prickett, Jones
& Elliott, P.A.
Heyman

Enerio

1.03

&

Gattuso
Hirzel LLP

Smith,
Katzenstein &
Jenkins LLP

Rosenthal,
Monhait &
Goddess, P.A.

3.82

Note. Heyman Enerio Gattuso & Hirzel LLP was formerly Proctor Heyman Enerio LLP.
Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A. closed in December 2019.

The top five law firms shown in Table 3 represent 59.2% of the cases during
the period spanning 2015-2019. The law firms turn out to be much more stable

Elliot,1 60 whereas from 2015-2019, the top spot is occupied by Grant

&

&

than their clients. Comparing Table 3 to data for 2000-2014 in Jiang et al., there
is a high degree of correlation between the law firms with only a few changes in
their relative ranks.1 59 From 2000-2014, the top law firm was Prickett, Jones
Eisenhofer.
Table 4 shows statistics on appraisal petitioners' invested capital, revealing
some new trends in appraisals since 2015.

159 See id. at 707 tbl.3.
160 Id
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Table 4. Appraisal Petitioners' Invested Capital and Investment Horizon

(January 2015-June 2019).

Value of
Invested
Capital

($)

Percent.
Ownership

()

Days

Days
Between
Effective
Date and
Filing of the

Days
Between
Filing of
First
Petition and

Filing of
First Petition
and Court

First Petition

Settlement
Date

Decision
Date

Between

Mean
Std. Dev.

47.668
75.976

2.45
3.34

73.4
42.7

405.8
240.0

953.6
272.0

ercentile

0.014

0.02

3

124

383

Percentile

4.364

0.32

38

191

811

entile

16.837

1.21

77

378

880

Peentile

58.250

3.45

118

554

1,149

Perentile

256.473

9.90

120

842

1,429

Note. Numbers in columns (1) and (2) are aggregated at the deal level.

The average (median) capital investment, at $47.7 million ($16.8 million), is
substantially higher than the same number, $26.3 million ($1.9 million), during

the 2000-2014 period. 16' This shows the impact of the de minimis amendment's
requirement of a minimum $1 million stake for appraisal eligibility. We can see
the effectiveness of the Delaware reform to restrict small-claim appraisals in the
data: for instance, the 25th percentile investment amounts to $4.4 million for the

2015-2019 period, compared to $583,000 for the 2000-2014 period. 162
On the other hand, the average (median) percent of ownership by petitioners

in target companies, at 2.45% (1.21%) for the 2015-2019 period, was lower than
the same statistic, 4.61% (1.37%), for the 2000-2014 period,1 63 suggesting that
companies with significantly higher market capitalization were targeted for

appraisal in the more recent time period.
These data also permit us to draw some other inferences. First, the average

dissident ownership in appraisal cases is substantially lower than the 6.3%
median ownership stake for hedge funds engaged in general hedge fund

activism'64 as well as the 8.3% for hedge funds specifically engaged in activism

161 Id. at 708 tbl.4.
162 Id.
63 Id.
'6 Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism,
CorporateGovernance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1747 (2008).
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targeting M&A transactions.165 Perhaps because appraisal seekers do not intend
to influence corporate policies or win sympathy from fellow shareholders, they
are able to accomplish their goals with a lower stake.
Table 4 also sheds light on the time frame for appraisal. The typical appraisal
166
petitioner makes their first filing 70-80 days after the merger effective date.
However, reaching settlement or going to trial takes much longer. The average

(median) time lag between the first petition filing to the settlement date is 406
(378) days for cases that settle, while for cases going to trial the wait until a court
decision is even longer at 954 (880) days. In some extreme cases (those falling

within the 95th percentile of our sample), the time to trial could run for over
three years.
However, as we will see below, petitioners may welcome the long wait

because the prejudgment interest-accrued at a rate of 5% above the federal
discount rate-paid by companies constitutes a significant part of the hedge
funds' investment gain.
To illustrate this point, Figure 3 plots the Delaware statutory interest rate and

the 2-year U.S. Treasury yield from 2000 to June 2019.
Figure 3. Delaware Statutory Interest Rate and 2-Year U.S. Treasury Yield.
12%
10%

--

8%
6%

2%.

0%

--

This figure plots the Delaware statutory interest rate and the 2-year U.S. Treasury yield
between January 2000 and June 2019. The darker line is the Delaware rate.

The low-yield environment since 2009 makes appraisal an attractive backdoor
fixed-income play. The 2016 Delaware interest-reduction amendment allows

16 Wei Jiang, Tao Li & Danqing Mei, Influencing Control: Jawboningin Risk Arbitrage,

73 J. FrN. 2635, 2665 tbl.7 (2018).
166 As noted in Part I, the Delaware statute requires petitioners to file within 120 days after
the effective date of the merger. DEL. ANN. CODE tit. 8, § 262(e) (2020).
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firms to prepay part of the full estimated valuation to obviate interest accrual.1 67
In order to determine how frequently this provision was used, we carefully
examined each of the trial judgments in our sample. Somewhat surprisingly, we

did not find any evidence of this practice being employed during the postreform
period among the cases that went to trial.1 68 In fact, all of the judicial opinions
indicate that the petitioners were entitled to the appraisal value plus the full
interest accrued. However, there have been a few prepayments made in other

cases. 169

VI. DATA ANALYSIS: APPRAISAL CHARACTERISTICS, RETURNS, AND NEW
TRENDS

Thus far, we have provided a broad overview of appraisal arbitrage data. In
this Part, we turn to a detailed empirical analysis that includes some multivariate
regression analyses.
A.

Firm and Deal CharacteristicsAssociated with Appraisals

Jiang et al. show that appraisal-eligible M&A transactions that attract
appraisal arbitrageurs have some systematic differences from appraisal-eligible

deals where shareholders do not file petitions. 170 Table 5 compares deal
characteristics and firm characteristics between the event sample and the control
sample for 2015-2019.

167 See supra Section III.B.
68 These are the only cases that we found with all of the necessary information to make a
determination of whether such payments were made.

169 See supra Section III.A.
170 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 699-700.
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Table 5. Comparison of Deal Characteristics (January 2015-June 2019).

Merger Targets with
Appraisals

Std.
Average Median

Dev.

Merger Targets Without
Appraisals

Difference Between
Columns
(1) and (2)

Average Median Std. Dev.

Diff. in
Avg.

t-Stat.
o
Diff.

(la)
26.5

(Tb)

(ic)

(2a)

(2b)

(2c)

(3a)

(3b)

22.5

27.8

51.2

31.4

114.5

-24.7*

-2.19

29.3

23.8

31.5

52.2

31.8

115.0

-22.9**

-2.02

Revision return

1.8

0

8.1

0.5

0

4.9

1.3**

2.15

Deal value ($
million)
Return on
assets ("ROA")
(%)
% Minority

3181.9

1379.5

6244.6

3153.0

611.3

8254.9

28.9

0.03

5.3

8.4

23.1

0.6

6.8

23.7

4.7*

1.77

12.3

0

33.0

3.3

0

17.9

9.0***

3.94

% Goingprivate
% Acquirer
toehold
%Friendly

32.0

0

46.8

20.8

0

40.6

11.2***

2.58

4.7

0

16.8

2.8

0

12.9

1.9

1.33

99.2

100

9.1

98.6

100

11.8

0.6

0.52

%Tender offer

20.5

0

40.5

21.7

0

41.3

-1.2

-0.30

Same
industry
Institutional
ownership (%)
Insider
ownership(%
Deal duration
(days)

30.3

0

46.2

48.2

0

50.0

-17.9***

-3.54

74.8

87.2

29.3

64.8

73.9

30.9

10.0***

2.88

11.3

4.2

18.3

9.2

3.1

14.3

2.1

1.22

111.9

81.5

89.1

112.6

76.0

118.4

-0.7

-0.06

Announcement
premium (%)
Final offer
premium(%

sgueezeout

Note. This table reports characteristics of 122 deals involving appraisal petitioners with
effective dates between January 2015 and June 2019 and compares them to 423 petitioneligible deals with no petitioners. Our sample includes all closed deals covered by the SDC
in which the target is incorporated in Delaware. All variables are defined in the Appendix.

*p<0.10; **p<0.05;***p<0.01
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The first striking contrast is in the takeover price premium,' 7 ' measured either
by announcement premium or final offer premium. The initial announcement
premium of deals involving appraisal, on average, is 24.7 percentage points
lower than the appraisal-eligible M&A transactions, and the difference remains
at 22.9 percentage points at deal finalization. Compared to the average takeover

premium of around 45%, such differences are substantial and statistically
significant. Based on these results, a low takeover premium appears to be an

important driver for appraisal filings. This holds true even in situations where
the acquirers sweeten the deal price to improve the prospect for deal completion;

the difference between the initial announcement premium and the final offer
premium suggests that appraisal-stricken deals already experienced more

favorable deal price revision. This is confirmed by an average difference of 1.3
percentage points in revision returns.

Table 5 also provides some additional insights into which firms are targeted
by appraisal seekers. These deals tend to have better operating performance as
measured by return on assets ("ROA").1 72 The difference of 4.7 percentage
points is both economically meaningful (relative to the average ROA of 1.9% in

our full M&A sample, including both deals with appraisal and those without it)
and statistically significant (at the 5% level). A better cash flow situation is often
one justification cited by appraisal petitioners for their demand for a higher

valuation. 7 3 Firms with healthy operating cash flows could attract litigation due
to their deep pockets.1 74
Deal size and deal duration are comparable between the two sample periods.
Since 2015, deals that involve appraisal are 9.0 percentage points more
be minority squeezeout transactions and 11.2 percentage points more
be going-private transactions. Both differences are significant at less
1% level and are of comparable magnitude to the earlier sample. Prior

likely to
likely to
than the
research

found that both of these forms of transactions are commonly perceived by public
shareholders as susceptible to conflicts of interest and unfair pricing. 7 5 By

comparison, deal receptivity (i.e., whether the board endorses the deal) and form

Definitions of all variables in the analyses are listed in the Appendix.
ROA is defined as the ratio of EBITDA to lagged assets. Brad M. Barber & John D.
Lyon, DetectingAbnormal OperatingPerformance: The EmpiricalPower and Specification
of Test Statistics, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 359, 364 (1996).
173 Cash flow multiples are one of the commonly adopted valuation metrics.
See TIM
171

172

KOLLER, MARC GOEDHART & DAVID WESSELS, VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE

VALUE OF COMPANIES 138 (6th ed. 2015).
174 Lauren Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Trolls: Evidence from
TargetedFirms, 65 MGMT. SC. 5461, 5462 (2019).
175 Thomas W. Bates, Michael L. Lemmon & James S. Linck, Shareholder Wealth Effects

and Bid Negotiation in Freeze-Out Deals:Are Minority ShareholdersLeft Out in the Cold?,
81 J. FIN. ECON. 681, 682 (2006); Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo & Edward M. Rice,
Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J.L. & ECON. 367, 367-68

(1984).
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(e.g., whether there is a tender offer) do not impact the likelihood that a deal is
targeted by appraisal seekers.
Appraisal petitioners are less likely to target deals with potential operational
synergies, so mergers of firms within the same industry are significantly (at the
1% level) less likely to invite appraisal. Finally, petitioners are more likely to
target deals with greater institutional ownership, presumably because such target

stocks have a more liquid market and greater analyst following. Knowing this,
appraisal arbitrageurs' stock purchases would have a lower price impact on stock
prices. Moreover, given the availability of valuation opinions to institutional
investors, plaintiffs are more likely to be able to refer to analysts or other
professional opinions that advocate for a higher valuation. Interestingly, insider
ownership, which usually is thought to deter shareholder activism because of the
increased voting power of the incumbents, does not affect appraisal choices.
This may be because appraisal is a remedy rendered by the court rather than a
remedy that relies on an actual or latent shareholder voting process.
In Figure 4, we plot the number of appraisal rulings by valuation method.
Figure 4. Number of Appraisal Rulings by Valuation Method.
7
6
5
0 Other Model

4

Q Unaffected Market Price

3

uMerger Price

/

Discounted Cash Flow
2

1

0
2017

2018

2019

This figure shows the annual number of Delaware Court of Chancery rulings in which a
chancellor used discounted cash flow analysis, merger price, unaffected market price, or some
other model to determine the fair value of target stock. Our sample includes all deals that
became effective between January 2015 and June 2019 and were determined by a chancellor

before November 1, 2019.
In both 2017 and 2018, chancellors performed discounted cash flow analyses
in 50% of cases, including SWS Group and AOL. Only two deals, including
PetSmart, were analyzed using merger offer as the fair price. However, the
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Delaware Supreme Court's 2017 decisions in DFC Global and Dell appear to
have resulted in a shift toward using merger price as the most popular

benchmark: the method accounted for 60% of court rulings in 2019, while the
discounted cash flow method was used in only 20% of cases.
B.

Determinants of AppraisalLitigation and Trial: Comparison of Predictive
Power

While Table 5 provides some descriptive evidence about the likelihood of
appraisal seekers to target a deal, in Table 6 we provide a formal model for
predicting appraisal filings for eligible M&A transactions by the firm and deal
characteristics just discussed. We use a probit model and a sample spanning
from January 2015 to June 2019 in our regression. After obtaining the results,
we compare the coefficients with those derived from the 2000-2014 sample
studied in Jiang et al.1 76

176 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 714 tb1.7.
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Table 6. Comparison of Predictive Regressions Between Separate Sample

Periods.
2000-2014

January 2015-June 2019

Coefficient

t-Stat.

Marg.

(1c)

(2a)

(2b)

(2c)

-2.00

-13.2

-0.63"

-2.30

-7.2

0.20

1.21

6.1

0.25*

1.95

3.0

0.39

1.18

13.0

0.59***

3.18

9.8

-0.08

-0.33

-2.4

0.12*

2.00

1.3

0.21

0.33

5.7

0.17

0.45

1.7

1.07***

2.63

31.8

0.24

1.00

2.7

-0.08

-1.30

-2.2

0.05

1.21

0.5

Insider ownership

0.38

0.96

11.2

-0.11

-0.36

-1.2

Same industry

-0.23

-1.55

-6.8

-0.14

-1.19

-1.6

ROA (%)

-0.01

-0.01

-0.2

0.12

0.41

1.4

1.89

2.6

Announcement
Annmum
premim
Going-private
Minority
sueezeout
Excess yield (%)
Friendly
Institutional

Coefficient

t-Stat.

(la)

(ib)

-0.45"

ownership
Deal value (log $

PM arg.

million)

Tender offer

-0.02

-0.10

-0.5

0.21*

Observations

417

1,326

Pseudo R-squared

0.06

0.06

Appraisal (%)

23.7

6.9

Note. All independent variables are as defined in the Appendix and are measured at the
effective date, except when otherwise defined. The dependent variable is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if a deal is targeted by one or more appraisal petitioners and 0 if it involves no such
petitioners. Each column reports probit coefficients, their heteroscedasticity-robust tstatistics, and the marginal probability change induced by a one-unit change in the value of a
specific covariate from its sample average.

*p< 0.10; **p<0.05;***p<0.01

When we use a multivariate model, there are only two statistically significant
predictive variables: announcement premium and institutional ownership. While

the first variable's effect is similar in the new sample (2015-2019) and the old
sample (2000-2014), the institutional ownership variable is insignificant in the
earlier years.177 We hypothesize that one effect of the de minimis amendment
was to eliminate small shareholders from filing appraisal petitions in the later

1?? Id.
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time period, leaving only the larger shareholders who more commonly hold
institutionally owned targets.

Unlike the earlier time period, the coefficients on going-private and minority
squeezeout transactions are not statistically significant. However, their
economic magnitude, as shown by their respective marginal probabilities, is

actually larger than that from the 2000-2014 sample. 7 8 This suggests that the
lost significance of these two variables was mostly due to decreased statistical
power associated with the smaller sample size for the 2015-2019 period in
comparison with the earlier study.
Finally, excess yield,1 79 which predicted appraisal litigation in the 2000-2014
period,1 80 completely lost its significance in the recent sample. We note that
since 2015, we have mostly been in a low-yield environment, which causes a
lack of variation in excess yield during the 2015-2019 period. We believe that

this likely contributed to the nonresult because a regression cannot identify the
effect of a variable that varies very little within the sample.
In Table 7, we further analyze the determinants of a filed appraisal petition
actually going to trial, instead of being settled or withdrawn. As in Table 6, we
also compare the sensitivities of trial outcomes to variable firm and deal
characteristics between the two sample periods. We begin by noting that only
9.1% of appraisal cases went to trial during the 2015-2019 period, which is

substantially below the 15.4% probability of going to trial during the 2000-2014
period.

'?7

Id.

179 Excess yield is defined as the spread between the federal discount rate plus 5% and the
yield on 2-year U.S. Treasury notes.
180 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 714 tbl.7.
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Table 7. Trial Among Appraisal Petitions Between Separate Sample Periods.

2000-2014

January 2015-June 2019
PrMarg.

Coefficient

t-Stat. Marg Prob.

Coefficient

t-Stat.

(1a)

(1b)

(lc)

(2a)

(2b)

(2c)

0.78*

1.70

8.8

1.09**

2.43

22.4

-0.86

-1.35

-9.5

-0.57

-0.71

-10.1

-0.01

-0.02

-0.1

0.01

0.00

0.1

0.69

0.81

11.9

0.38

0.71

7.8

Excess yield (%)
Friendly

-2.23
-

-1.61

-24.4

-0.18
-1.26

-0.39
-1.29

-3.1
-38.6

Institutional

-3.54**

-2.15

-38.7

0.11

0.12

1.9

0.20

0.94

2.2

-0.07

-0.51

-1.2

-8.00**

-2.41

-87.5

0.83

1.14

14.6

-0.36
1.78

-0.68
1.57

-3.7
19.5

-0.92*
-0.93

-1.66
-0.94

-13.5
-16.4

Tender offer

0.02

0.03

0.2

0.69*

1.68

13.9

Observations

75

91

Pseudo R-

0.23

squared
Trial (%)

0.24

9.1

15.4

I (Investment >

$10m
Announcement
premium
Going-private
Minority
squeezeout

ownership
Deal value (log
million
Insider
ownership
Same industry
ROA (%)

Note. All independent variables are as defined in the Appendix and are measured at the
effective date, except when otherwise defined. The dependent variable is a dummy variable
for the appraisal being brought to trial rather than being settled. In each column, we report
probit coefficients, their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics, and the marginal probability
change induced by a one unit change in the value of a specific covariate from its sample
average.

*p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01
In both time periods, the indicator variable I (Investment > $10 million)

predicts that the probability of going to trial is higher for bigger investors. The
magnitude of this effect is substantial: an increase of 8.8% likelihood in the
2015-2019 period, which is a substantial difference relative to the base
probability of 15.4%.
In contrast, both institutional ownership and insider ownership work
significantly (at the 5% level) against going to trial in the 2015-2019 period,
even though such effects were insignificant in the 2000-2014 period. This shows
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that in recent years-when insiders have more at stake and when a company is
subject to more public scrutiny and coverage in the market because of its
institutional ownership-the acquirer is more likely to opt for settlement instead
of going through a lengthy process with uncertain outcomes and publicity.
C.

Petitioners'Returnsfrom AppraisalLitigation

In this final Section, we break out the factors that influence the returns to
appraisal arbitrage. To the extent that appraisal litigation is an arbitrage strategy
as much as a governance remedy, the returns to appraisal petitioners are the key

driver for such activities. We begin by noting that we are not able to observe the
full picture of returns to appraisal petitioners for two reasons. First, over 90% of
appraisal cases in the 2015-2019 period were settled out of court and the terms

of these settlements are frequently undisclosed due to confidentiality
agreements. Second, we cannot observe the legal and administrative costs of
litigating appraisal petitions, without which we cannot calibrate net returns to
the petitioners, even for the trial sample and a subset of the settlement cases in
which we have information about the final valuation.
Despite these challenges, we can conduct a precost analysis of returns for a
subsample of 35 cases (30 from the trial sample and 5 from the settlement
sample), which we believe casts some light on the economic drivers of appraisal
activities. Moreover, it is common in finance literature to focus on gross

returns-instead of returns netted for execution costs and related business
costs-when analyzing trading strategies.'81
Table 8 reports gross returns to appraisal petitioners.

181 See, e.g., Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual FundPerformance, 52 J. FN. 57,
71 (1997) (ranking funds based on gross returns); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French,
Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (1993)
(focusing on returns without considering costs); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The
Cross-Sectionof Expected Stock Returns, 47 J. FIN. 427,427 (1992) (discussing return models
without reference to costs).
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Table 8. Gross Returns from Appraisal Litigation (January 2015-June 2019).

Average

Std.
Dev.

13.2

9.2

8.9
-15.6

25th
Percentile

75th

Median

Percentile

6.4

14.5

20.1

15.8

2.6

5.2

7.2

16.6

-24.5

-16.6

-5.4

13.2

-8.9

-5.1

-2.2

Full sample (N=35):
Total raw return (%)
Annualized raw

return (%)
Market-adjusted total

return (%)
Market-adjusted

annualized return
(%)
Trial subsample
(N=30):

-3.2

Total raw return (%)

12.8

8.5

6.4

14.5

15.3

4.5

3.0

2.6

4.9

6.3

-5.3

7.6

-7.8

-3.4

0

-1.8

2.7

-2.5

-1.4

0

18.1

5.0

14.5

20.1

21.1

6.1

1.3

6.0

6.1

6.3

Total raw return (%)

15.6

14.2

0

26.0

26.0

Annualized raw

35.3

32.2

0

58.8

58.8

Annualized raw

__

return (%)
Total return from
value improvement

(%)
Annualized return
from value
improvement

(%)
Total return from
interest accrual %)
Annualized return
from interest accrual

(%)
Settlement

subsample (N=5):

return

(%)____________________

An average appraisal filing between 2015-2019 yields a total gross return of
13.2%. In the trial subsample (for which the average total gross return is 12.8%),

we can break out these returns into two components: returns from value
improvement and returns from interest accrual. For this subsample, we learn that
182
was, on average, negative 5.3%, while interest
judicial value improvement
accrual contributed 18.1%. Importantly, as shown in Figure 5 below, the average
value improvement has dipped below 0% since 2017.

182 This is defined as the percentage value premium of the judicially determined valuation
over the deal price.
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Figure 5. Appraisal Returns by Outcome Year.
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This figure plots the average total raw return and the return from value improvement in
appraisal actions by outcome year for deals that became effective between January 2015 and
June 2019. Appraisal outcomes refer to settlement or court determination.

The negative average value improvement, it turns out, was representative of
the post-2014 era. We find that in 56.7% of the cases in Table 8, judicial value

improvement was negative. In addition to the Aruba decision, other notable
cases include appraisal petitions filed at Jarden Corporation and SWS Group.
For example, in In re Appraisal of Jarden Corp.,183 the Delaware Court of

Chancery determined that the fair value of Jarden was best represented by the
unaffected market price of the company's shares, which was 18.4% less than the
merger price.1 84 In the May 2017 case In re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc.,1 85 a

chancellor used a discounted cash flow analysis and found that the fair value of
the petitioners' shares as of the merger date was $6.38, 7.8% less than the merger
price. 8 6 Vice Chancellor Glasscock reasoned that the result from this analysis
was not surprising as "this was a synergies-driven transaction whereby the
acquirer shared value arising from the merger with SWS."187

These return numbers are a sharp drop from their counterparts during the
2000-2014 period. At that time, the average total gross return to filing an

appraisal petition for the full sample was 98.2%.188 However, if we look solely

183 C.A. No. 12456-VCS, 2019 WL 3244085 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2019).
184 See id. at *3, *50.
1

C.A. No. 10554-VCG, 2017 WL 2334852 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017).
id. at *1, *18.

86 See

187

Id. at *18.

88 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 721 tbl.11.
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at the trial sample, total raw returns were even higher at 108.3%.189 Moreover,
in the trial subsample during the earlier period, the return from judicial value

improvement was 50.6%, and there was no case in which total appraisal
190
Finally, the total return from interest
valuation was below the deal price.
accrual in the 2015-2019 period was less than one-third of what the average

petitioner earned in the earlier period (57.8%).191 This sharp drop seems to have
92
been caused by low interest rates in the economy.1
During the 2015-2019 period, appraisal filings as an investment strategy

performed poorly on an annualized basis. The average annualized raw return
was 8.9%, which substantially underperformed the general stock market by 3.2
percentage points during the same period. Moreover, in over 75% of the deals,

petitioners received total returns that were lower than what they would have
earned by investing in the stock market index even before taking into
consideration additional legal and business costs associated with appraisal
litigation. On top of these low returns, Jiang et al. estimate that the typical
appraisal action likely costs the plaintiff legal expenses on the order of $1 to $3
million.1 9 3 While such costs could have been easily covered by outsized payouts
prior to 2015, during the most recent time period they would have further

aggravated the underperformance of the arbitrage strategy. The fact that
chancellors did not shy away from assigning valuations that were significantly

below the deal price was a driving force for such low returns, which led to the
dry up of appraisal activities. This is particularly likely to be true in the aftermath
of DFCGlobal, Dell, and Aruba.
In Table 9, we take this analysis one step further and correlate deal-level total
returns to deal and firm characteristics. We then compare the resulting
coefficients from the 2015-2019 period with those from the 2000-2014 period.

18 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 See supra Figure 3.

193 Jiang et al., supra note 4, at 722.
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Table 9. Determinants of Total Raw Returns: Comparison Between Sample

Periods.
January 2015-June 2019
t-Stat.

Coefficient

i-Stat.

(la)

(ib)

(2a)

(2b)

-8.06

-1.42***

-3.96

0.52***

6.12

Announcement

Announme-0.63***
premium
Going-private

0.63***

4.16

eeeout

0.48***

4.62

Excess yield (%

-0.55***

-3.83

Friendly
Institutional
ownership

2000-2014

Coefficient

-0.12

-1.03

0.001

0.04

-1.26***

-4.47

-2.13***

-5.13

1.08***

4.48

Deal value (log $
million

0.12***

4.25

0.03***

3.26

Insider ownership

5.57***

3.14

0.47"*

4.98

Same industry

0.49***

5.42

ROA %

0.34***

4.39

Tender offer

0.41***

3.95

Observations

33

0.66***
-0.14
0.56***

6.37
-0.35
4.31

98

R-squared

0.95
0.59
Note. The dependent variable is total raw return (decimal number). All independent
variables are as defined in the Appendix and are measured at the effective date, except when
otherwise defined. In each column, we report coefficients and their t-statistics. Standard errors
are clustered by year.
*

p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01

In Table 9, we see that high announcement premiums are associated with
significantly lower (at the 1% level) returns to appraisal arbitrage. This likely

arises because judicial value improvement has a low upside potential when the
offered premium was already high. Going-private deals, minority squeezeout

deals, tender offer deals, and firms with high insider ownership have
significantly higher (at the 1% level) returns to appraisal filings as well. This
suggests that chancellors take into consideration the likelihood that shareholders
in these deals are vulnerable to opportunistic conduct arising out of agency
problems and that therefore there is more room for value improvement in
appraisal. Institutional ownership is associated with lower returns, as the market

valuation is more likely to be considered fair value because such stocks are
subject to more shareholder monitoring, are more liquidly traded, and have
greater analyst following. Having M&A partners in the same industry and firms

2176

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:2133

with higher ROA are both associated with higher returns. Note that these effects
are conditional on other covariates-most importantly, the announcement
premium-being held constant. Because both the potential synergies and the
operational strength offer more upside in valuation, it is easier for the plaintiff
to argue that takeover premium undervalues the target.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In this Article, we described and empirically analyzed the rise and fall of
appraisal arbitrage. We find that while the returns to appraisal arbitrage were
robust during the 2000-2014 period, they fell drastically from 2015-2019
because of changes to the Delaware appraisal statute and adverse opinions of the
Delaware Supreme Court expressed in DFC Global, Dell, and Aruba. While
both of these forces had a negative impact on the returns to appraisal arbitrage,
we show that the Delaware cases and their emphasis on using deal price as fair
value was the more important contributor.
The policy implications of these results depend largely on one's perspective

on the value of appraisal arbitrage. If appraisal arbitrage is a socially wasteful
exercise, then plainly killing it off is a good thing and these Delaware cases were
correctly decided. However, if appraisal arbitrage is a valuable monitoring
mechanism that scrutinizes low premium deals with conflicts of interest, then
perhaps the Delaware Supreme Court should rethink its earlier opinions and
open the door for the Court of Chancery to use other valuation methods more
frequently.
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Announcement premium

(Poge-P-i) / P.i, where Poffer is the initial offer price,
P-1 is the previous-day close of target firm's stock price.

Final offer premium

(PFinaI - P-,) / P., where PFinal is the final offer price.

Revision return

(PFnal- Pffer) /P-i.

Deal value ($ million)

Total value of consideration paid by the acquirer,
excluding fees and expenses.

Return on assets
("ROA")

Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and
amortization scaled by lagged assets.

Minority squeezeout

Indicator equal to 1 if a controlling shareholder buys
out a minority shareholder's stock to eliminate that
shareholder; value = 0 otherwise.

Going-private

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquisition involves a
publicly traded company being converted into a private
entity, usually by insider-led buyouts; value = 0 otherwise.

Acquirer toehold

Percentage of target shares held by the acquirer prior to
the announcement.

Friendly

Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the target
company resists or receives an unsolicited offer
as reported; value = 0 otherwise.

Tender offer

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bid takes the form of a
tender offer; value = 0 otherwise.

Same industry

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target and acquirer
are in the same three-digit SIC industry; value = 0
otherwise.

Institutional ownership

Proportion of shares held by institutional investors, as
reported by the Thomson Reuters Ownership Database.

Insider ownership

Proportion of shares held by company insiders, as
reported by the Thomson Reuters Ownership Database.

Deal duration

Number of calendar days between the first takeover
announcement and the announced resolution of the deal.

Excess yield (%)

Spread between the federal discount rate plus 5% and the
yield on 2-year U.S. Treasury notes.

I (Investment > $10m)

Indicator equal to 1 if the petitioners collectively hold
shares valued more than $10 million; value = 0
otherwise.

Market-adjusted total
return

Difference between total raw return and the CRSP valueweighted all-market return during the same period.
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